


25 August 1965

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Dominican Republic: Both sides are taking positions that may delay a negotiated settlement.

The rebels, despite their earlier acceptance of the article on negotiations for withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), now are demanding that the settlement state that these negotiations must begin "immediately." The rebels have also presented their formal reservation specifying their understanding that the provisional government has the exclusive right to determine the IAPF's date of withdrawal. Caamano said he will ask for at least one other modification, changing the name of the "Act of Reconciliation."

Imbert, who has publicly pointed out that his previous acceptance of the settlement was conditioned on its being unchanged, told the OAS Committee he would study the revised terms but did not indicate when he would reply.

Top military leaders appear to be giving second thoughts to their prior endorsement of the agreement. They may demand the inclusion of several provisions, some erasing changes made to conciliate the rebels, and others satisfying long-standing demands for limiting the integration of rebel military personnel into the armed forces.

If, however, the military leaders agree to the settlement, Imbert will have difficulty in holding out. In addition the severe financial situation facing Imbert since the suspension of OAS aid may act to pressure his regime into signing.

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Saudi Arabia - Egypt - Yemen: Yesterday's Nasir-Faysal agreement to end the war in Yemen may be difficult to implement.

The text indicates that the agreement incorporates most of the main points of contention between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, the degree of support it will receive from the leaders of the warring royalist and republican Yemeni factions is uncertain.

The agreement envisages three phases covering a span of 15 months. The initial three-month period would be used to end the fighting by joint observer teams, who would also distribute assistance in the form of foodstuffs. This phase would culminate in a national conference on 23 November which must choose the form of the provisional government and select the members of a caretaker Yemeni cabinet. The next ten months would cover the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. The final two months would be used to carry out a referendum, under neutral supervision if necessary, in which the Yemenis would decide upon their final form of government.

On the surface the agreement appears to be a great diplomatic success for Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, until the Yemenis have indicated their concurrence by co-operation in the cease-fire, it must be regarded only as a statement of good intentions. Implementation will also raise many other questions which will test the good faith and determination of the principals.


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Tibet - Communist China: The formation of a Tibet Autonomous Region to be established on 1 September, after long years of delay, probably will be accompanied by further measures to speed up the "socialization" of Tibet.

There will likely be considerable hostility to the new government. The Chinese, increasingly impatient with the Tibetans, last December deposed the Panchen Lama, the resident spiritual leader of Tibet. They also announced they would tolerate no opposition to "reforms" they intended to institute soon.

Tibetan affairs will continue to be run by the Party Committee for Tibet, composed almost entirely of Han Chinese, although a safe Tibetan such as the present acting chairman of the preparatory committee may be named to head the government. Because of the strong opposition among Tibetans to Chinese rule, Peking will probably also feel compelled to retain Chinese in positions of authority down to the local level.

Peking has no illusions about the extent of dissident feeling in Tibet and continues to maintain adequate garrison forces there. Although banditry and scattered dissident actions still occasionally occur, recent Western press stories about fresh outbreaks of guerrilla activity in Tibet have not been confirmed and may be exaggerated.

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NOTES

South Korea: An estimated 9,000 students battled police in Seoul yesterday, and they plan to continue demonstrations. The students are demanding that the National Assembly's 14 August ratification of the Korean-Japanese agreements be voided and that new assembly elections be held. Many of them are receiving financial backing from the opposition People's Party, whose boycott of the assembly vote has given the demonstrators an opportunity to make the spurious claim that the ratification was illegal. The government has alerted nearby army divisions, but so far has kept the situation under control with small troop units and tear gas.

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Kashmir: UN Undersecretary Bunche now says that his planned visit to South Asia is "unlikely," but that "something new" might be forthcoming shortly. Bunche may have had in mind a statement by U Thant. Nigeria has reportedly volunteered its "good offices" in working out some solution of the problem, and an authoritative article in Pravda has urged caution on both sides. In Kashmir the situation remains essentially unchanged.

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